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Okla-homey
6/3/2007, 08:37 AM
June 3, 1864: Union disaster at Cold Harbor

143 years ago, on this day in 1864, General Ulysses S. Grant makes what he later recognizes to be his greatest mistake by ordering a frontal assault on entrenched Confederates at Cold Harbor in Virginia. The result was some 7,000 US casualties in less than an hour of fighting.

http://aycu34.webshots.com/image/17193/2001962142375047635_rs.jpg (http://allyoucanupload.webshots.com/v/2001962142375047635)
Most of the Cold Harbor carnage was not cleaned-up until the following Spring at wars end. In April of 1865, these freed black men were paid a few cents per body to bury the Cold Harbor remains from the previous June.

To put all this in context, please understand that Grant was one of the first US leaders to understand the way to beat Lee was to just keep slugging it out on the line of scrimmage. The record was littered with Federal generals who had try to out-fox Lee with grand offensive schemes. Lee was simply too accomplished at that game to be taken in by it. Grant understood Lee's defensive secondary was too good at defending a complex and gimmicky pass-based offense.

http://aycu34.webshots.com/image/17193/2001999263860722877_rs.jpg (http://allyoucanupload.webshots.com/v/2001999263860722877)
Grant

Instead, Grant decided it was better to just keep Lee engaged and win at the line of scrimmage by pounding away and running for three yards per down, and to never let Lee's gray team catch it's breath. The problem on this day, was this was the next down after a day-long time-out and Lee's boys had the time to catch their breath

Grant's Army of the Potomac and Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had already inflicted frightful losses upon each other as they wheeled along an arc around Richmond—from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania and numerous smaller battle sites—the previous month.

On May 30, Lee and Grant collided at Bethesda Church. The next day, the advance units of the armies arrived at the strategic crossroads of Cold Harbor, just 10 miles from Richmond, where a Federal attack seized the intersection.

Sensing that there was a chance to destroy Lee at the gates of Richmond, Grant prepared for a major assault along the entire Confederate front on June 2. But when Gen Winfield Hancock's corps did not arrive on schedule, the operation was postponed until the following day.

http://aycu21.webshots.com/image/19180/2001936751425734581_rs.jpg (http://allyoucanupload.webshots.com/v/2001936751425734581)
Cold Harbor, Virginia 1864 from NARA Records
Left to right, Division Commanders: Francis C. Barlow, David B. Birney and John Gibbon, seated Corps Commander General Winfield Scott Hancock

The delay was tragic for the US, because it gave Lee's troops time to entrench. By this point in thr war, if given a few hours pending a predicted attack, soldiers on both sides instinctively had learned to dig -- with their bare hands if necessary -- in order to throw up some cover. In this case, Lee's boys had a whole day and in that amount of time, they were able to dig ditches in which they could shelter and return fire. Such hasty defenses increased the force ratio needed to carry off an attack to almost 3:1.

http://aycu18.webshots.com/image/17297/2001957313150112868_rs.jpg (http://allyoucanupload.webshots.com/v/2001957313150112868)
Remnants of the Confederate hasty entrenchments at Cold Harbor remain. They don't look like much today, but a few feet of earth at a mans front could mean life or death during the Civil War

Perhaps frustrated with the protracted pursuit of Lee's army, Grant gave the order to attack on June 3—a decision that resulted in an unmitigated disaster.

The Federals met murderous fire, and were only able to reach the Confederate trenches in a few places. The 7,000 Union casualties, compared to only 1,500 for the Confederates, were all lost in under an hour.

Grant pulled out of Cold Harbor nine days later and continued to hound Lee's army. The next stop was Petersburg, south of Richmond, where a nine-month siege ensued. There would be no more attacks on the scale of Cold Harbor, but Lee and his Army were penned in on their own 5 yd line and time was on the side of the bigger more powerful Union offense.

When Petersburg fell the following spring, after a hot summer and cold winter of 1864-65, the way to Richmond was open and the jig was up for the South in the eastern theater.

http://aycu31.webshots.com/image/17430/2001957139894021592_rs.jpg (http://allyoucanupload.webshots.com/v/2001957139894021592)

Jerk
6/3/2007, 08:52 AM
Reading this reminded me of the 'human wave attacks' that the Chicoms tried against the U.S. in North Korea.

Someone even mentions the Civil War in this Wilkipedia article on human wave attacks:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_wave_attack

SicEmBaylor
6/3/2007, 02:00 PM
Reading this reminded me of the 'human wave attacks' that the Chicoms tried against the U.S. in North Korea.

Someone even mentions the Civil War in this Wilkipedia article on human wave attacks:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_wave_attack
The Ruskies did the same damned thing during WWII. Their idea of advanced infantry tactics was using rear echelon troops and penal brigades as a human cannon fodder. :rolleyes:

Jerk
6/3/2007, 02:08 PM
The Ruskies did the same damned thing during WWII. Their idea of advanced infantry tactics was using rear echelon troops and penal brigades as a human cannon fodder. :rolleyes:

It is my lowly opinion that the eastern front in ww2 was the worst, most barbaric, and most cruel conflict in all of human history.

NYSooner1355
6/3/2007, 04:08 PM
According to a book I recently read - On Killing: Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society by Lt. Col Dave Grossman, USA (Ret.) the Cold Harbor incident is a bit of a myth (i.e., the number of deaths in the timespan noted). According to the book the account of Cold Harbor is exaggerated - it debunks the misconception that 7000 casualties occurred in "Eight Minutes", he says that the belief is not so much wrong as it is a "gross oversimplification". According to this research it took over EIGHT HOURS to inflict the casualties - and it was mostly artlillery that inflicted most of the casualties.

Okla-homey
6/3/2007, 05:24 PM
According to a book I recently read - On Killing: Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society by Lt. Col Dave Grossman, USA (Ret.) the Cold Harbor incident is a bit of a myth (i.e., the number of deaths in the timespan noted). According to the book the account of Cold Harbor is exaggerated - it debunks the misconception that 7000 casualties occurred in "Eight Minutes", he says that the belief is not so much wrong as it is a "gross oversimplification". According to this research it took over EIGHT HOURS to inflict the casualties - and it was mostly artlillery that inflicted most of the casualties.

Good points. The thing is, Civil War casualty figures are notoriously innaccurate given the accounting methods of the day. The were often based on a post action roll-call and/or morning reports compiled by each company the following day and forwarded thru regimental, division and corps headquarters before being totalled for a given battle. Given it was all done in longhand, sometimes there were errors in ciphering.

That said, Army of the Potomac total casualties on June 3, 1864 were reported at 5,900, among five infantry corps, per Chief of Staff Andrew Humphreys. Of this, per Gordon Rhea's scholarship, 3,000 to 3,500 occured during the famous charge by the Second, Sixth, and Eightteenth Corps. This further goes into perspective when one understands that 900 of the Federal casualties that day occured in one single brigade (Tyler's/Corcoran Legion, Gibbon's division, Second Corps), and 700 occured in another brigade in Barlow's division, Second Corps. Those two brigade--greenhorns--accounted for nearly half the Federal losses in the grand assault.

Regarding artillery inflicted casualties, the use of field artillery (especially firing "canister" which turned Reb cannon into giant shotguns firing hundreds of steel balls with each round) usually was responsible for more casualties among attackers than musketry during the entire war.

I'm a bit of a student of Civil War artillery. When defending, they began the engagement with shell, which exploded over the heads of an attacking force at a pre-determined interval and spewed shrapnel when the enemy formation was at long range. Another choice was solid iron shot (about 12 pounds in weight and approximately grapfruit sized) fired directly into a formation at long range which bowled guys over just like bowling pins.

When the enemy got in closer, they often switched to grapeshot which involved about a eight handball sized steel balls to wreak havoc among the formations. Finally, when inside 100 yds, they went to the canister which could take out up to twenty men with a single round.

garland sooner
6/4/2007, 12:00 AM
I really liked the metaphors! history made fun.