Jerk
5/9/2007, 08:54 PM
(Only gun geeks, rednecks, formal .mil will find this interesting)
Remember the post you made several weeks ago about how bad the Army is for not replacing all M4/M16 uppers with the piston operated HK416?
Colt Defense Responds..
Dear Editor,
Until the cancellation of the XM8 program in 2005, Army Times and its staff writer, Matthew Cox, strongly promoted the HK XM8 for its adoption as the service weapon for the US Army. In his recent feature article, “It’s better than the M4, but you can’t have one” Mr. Cox attributes cancellation of the XM8 program to “a sea of bureaucratic opposition.” Mr. Cox fails to mention a DoD IG report on the Acquisition of the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (D-2006-004) dated October 7, 2005, which addresses the XM8 Program and is found at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports. This DoD IG report clearly stated the rationale, which indicated the XM8 offered no potential efficiency over the present weapons systems, as well as including mismanagement by those persons responsible for the program, both of which clearly may have been a strong consideration in the cancellation of the program. Another related and informative DoD IG report is Competition of the 5.56 Millimeter Carbine (D-2007-026) dated November 22, 2006 and is also found at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports. Now, promoting the HK 416, Mr. Cox references unnamed experts, misrepresents data for comparison between the HK 416 and M4, misleads readers by using findings in a 2001 SOCOM report on the M4 and a Marine Corps test of the M4 in 2002 but he does not inform the reader of measures taken immediately by the Army and Colt to eliminate those problems, uses quotes to imply the M16 and M4 are the same weapon used 42 years ago, which they are clearly not, and bases his argument for adoption of the HK 416 for the entire US Army on use by a group of elite operators within SOCOM who rightfully develop their own kit of weapons and modify them to their needs. His stated rationale is based on unsupervised tests made on a rifle made in Germany.
Additionally, his writing very wrongly alleges that Army leadership is not providing our men and women in uniform the best weapon available and, more disturbing, his article irresponsibly raises a concern to the Soldiers, Marines and Special Operations Forces in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and their families that their service weapon is not reliable. This is absolutely not a true statement and could cause serious morale issues to those engaged in day to day combat operations and to those in leadership positions in these units. To go further I would question his loyalty to those in uniform and his lack of real credibility, truthfulness and personal integrity in writing an article of this nature.
The M4 speaks for itself as to its combat credibility. Before its introduction into the US Army inventory in 1994 it was subjected to the full range of functioning and environmental tests required by the US Army test and evaluation process. Later, as a result of the 2001 SOCOM report on the M4, referred to by Mr. Cox, the US Army and Colt immediately conducted a joint effort to rectify the problems raised. This effort took until spring 2002 and manufacturing changes were implemented at Colt by fall 2002. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps conducted their own test of the M4 with weapons produced prior to the fall 2002 manufacturing change and they experienced similar problems as SOCOM. These issues were also resolved with the manufacturing changes implemented thereafter. From fall 2002 to today, government quality deficiency reports for the M4 have been nearly non-existent and that is attributable to the joint effort between the US Army and Colt to solve the problems raised in the 2001 and 2002 reports. Additionally, regarding reliability of the M4, from fall 2002, US government inspectors at the Colt plant have overseen the firing of nearly 4,000,000 (million) endurance rounds with only three endurance gun failures: one in January 2004, one in July 2005 and one in August 2005. The government quality assurance representative at Colt holds the documents supporting this testing. In June 2006, Colt had the opportunity to endurance fire an HK 416. At 3,000 rounds, a broken firing pin spring was found in the HK 416. Without a spare part, the endurance testing was ended. Other findings in those 3,000 rounds of firing were frequent loosening of the hand guard retainer screw and the cyclic rate of fire was over 1,000 rounds per minute. The gas piston system in the H&K 416 is not a new system and was initially rejected by the Army for the M16 in the 1960’s. Colt Defense has the present ability and expertise to manufacture in great numbers piston system carbines of exceptional quality should the US Army and other US Services initiate a combat requirement for this type of weapon. Attached is an email written to Mr. Cox by a recognized weapons expert, Mr. Chris Bartocci, author of Black Rifle II, who provides background on the M16 and M4. Anecdotal examples of fouled weapons are not taken lightly, yet the information is not helpful if the type of fouling is not clearly defined. In a desert environment, for example, sand and dust have the same effects on a weapon, whether it has a gas piston system or a gas impingement system. This issue is completely different from a debate over a gas piston system operating cleaner than a gas impingement system. Is a gas piston operated weapon less vulnerable to the effects of the desert than a gas impingement system? If so, where are the results of the controlled tests. Additionally, there are a number of reasons for fouling of weapons to include the reliability of the ammunition and reliability of magazines. The M16 and M4 have undergone major enhancements since introduction of the M16 into the US military inventory in the 1960s. These enhancements have improved functioning, reliability, maintenance and versatility for the individual Soldier and Marine throughout the years. Currently, there is a government funded operational evaluation being conducted for SOCOM by Colt and Ultra Chem Technologies (UCT) for greaseless operating parts on the M4 to improve maintenance, functioning and the wear of select parts of the weapon. In closing, at the 2006 Laboratory and Industry Day sponsored by the Chief of Infantry and Commanding General United States Army Infantry Center & School, Fort Benning, Georgia, the M4 Carbine was listed by the Commanding General and included in his brief as one of the many success stories in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
James R. Battaglini
MajGen, USMC (Ret)
Chief Operating Officer
Colt Defense LLC
Remember the post you made several weeks ago about how bad the Army is for not replacing all M4/M16 uppers with the piston operated HK416?
Colt Defense Responds..
Dear Editor,
Until the cancellation of the XM8 program in 2005, Army Times and its staff writer, Matthew Cox, strongly promoted the HK XM8 for its adoption as the service weapon for the US Army. In his recent feature article, “It’s better than the M4, but you can’t have one” Mr. Cox attributes cancellation of the XM8 program to “a sea of bureaucratic opposition.” Mr. Cox fails to mention a DoD IG report on the Acquisition of the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (D-2006-004) dated October 7, 2005, which addresses the XM8 Program and is found at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports. This DoD IG report clearly stated the rationale, which indicated the XM8 offered no potential efficiency over the present weapons systems, as well as including mismanagement by those persons responsible for the program, both of which clearly may have been a strong consideration in the cancellation of the program. Another related and informative DoD IG report is Competition of the 5.56 Millimeter Carbine (D-2007-026) dated November 22, 2006 and is also found at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports. Now, promoting the HK 416, Mr. Cox references unnamed experts, misrepresents data for comparison between the HK 416 and M4, misleads readers by using findings in a 2001 SOCOM report on the M4 and a Marine Corps test of the M4 in 2002 but he does not inform the reader of measures taken immediately by the Army and Colt to eliminate those problems, uses quotes to imply the M16 and M4 are the same weapon used 42 years ago, which they are clearly not, and bases his argument for adoption of the HK 416 for the entire US Army on use by a group of elite operators within SOCOM who rightfully develop their own kit of weapons and modify them to their needs. His stated rationale is based on unsupervised tests made on a rifle made in Germany.
Additionally, his writing very wrongly alleges that Army leadership is not providing our men and women in uniform the best weapon available and, more disturbing, his article irresponsibly raises a concern to the Soldiers, Marines and Special Operations Forces in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and their families that their service weapon is not reliable. This is absolutely not a true statement and could cause serious morale issues to those engaged in day to day combat operations and to those in leadership positions in these units. To go further I would question his loyalty to those in uniform and his lack of real credibility, truthfulness and personal integrity in writing an article of this nature.
The M4 speaks for itself as to its combat credibility. Before its introduction into the US Army inventory in 1994 it was subjected to the full range of functioning and environmental tests required by the US Army test and evaluation process. Later, as a result of the 2001 SOCOM report on the M4, referred to by Mr. Cox, the US Army and Colt immediately conducted a joint effort to rectify the problems raised. This effort took until spring 2002 and manufacturing changes were implemented at Colt by fall 2002. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps conducted their own test of the M4 with weapons produced prior to the fall 2002 manufacturing change and they experienced similar problems as SOCOM. These issues were also resolved with the manufacturing changes implemented thereafter. From fall 2002 to today, government quality deficiency reports for the M4 have been nearly non-existent and that is attributable to the joint effort between the US Army and Colt to solve the problems raised in the 2001 and 2002 reports. Additionally, regarding reliability of the M4, from fall 2002, US government inspectors at the Colt plant have overseen the firing of nearly 4,000,000 (million) endurance rounds with only three endurance gun failures: one in January 2004, one in July 2005 and one in August 2005. The government quality assurance representative at Colt holds the documents supporting this testing. In June 2006, Colt had the opportunity to endurance fire an HK 416. At 3,000 rounds, a broken firing pin spring was found in the HK 416. Without a spare part, the endurance testing was ended. Other findings in those 3,000 rounds of firing were frequent loosening of the hand guard retainer screw and the cyclic rate of fire was over 1,000 rounds per minute. The gas piston system in the H&K 416 is not a new system and was initially rejected by the Army for the M16 in the 1960’s. Colt Defense has the present ability and expertise to manufacture in great numbers piston system carbines of exceptional quality should the US Army and other US Services initiate a combat requirement for this type of weapon. Attached is an email written to Mr. Cox by a recognized weapons expert, Mr. Chris Bartocci, author of Black Rifle II, who provides background on the M16 and M4. Anecdotal examples of fouled weapons are not taken lightly, yet the information is not helpful if the type of fouling is not clearly defined. In a desert environment, for example, sand and dust have the same effects on a weapon, whether it has a gas piston system or a gas impingement system. This issue is completely different from a debate over a gas piston system operating cleaner than a gas impingement system. Is a gas piston operated weapon less vulnerable to the effects of the desert than a gas impingement system? If so, where are the results of the controlled tests. Additionally, there are a number of reasons for fouling of weapons to include the reliability of the ammunition and reliability of magazines. The M16 and M4 have undergone major enhancements since introduction of the M16 into the US military inventory in the 1960s. These enhancements have improved functioning, reliability, maintenance and versatility for the individual Soldier and Marine throughout the years. Currently, there is a government funded operational evaluation being conducted for SOCOM by Colt and Ultra Chem Technologies (UCT) for greaseless operating parts on the M4 to improve maintenance, functioning and the wear of select parts of the weapon. In closing, at the 2006 Laboratory and Industry Day sponsored by the Chief of Infantry and Commanding General United States Army Infantry Center & School, Fort Benning, Georgia, the M4 Carbine was listed by the Commanding General and included in his brief as one of the many success stories in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
James R. Battaglini
MajGen, USMC (Ret)
Chief Operating Officer
Colt Defense LLC