BOOMERBRADLEY
11/6/2006, 05:17 PM
http://cfn.scout.com/2/557921.html
Stoops did what Berkeley economist and freelance football researcher David Romer has advocated in the realm of football strategy. We reported back in August that Romer--as stated in a Joe Nocera column from the June 24 edition of the New York Times--concluded from a series of personally conducted studies that football coaches are too conservative when it comes to fourth-down decision making. More boldness and fewer punts were Romer's twin recommendations. Well, if you saw Saturday night's game between Oklahoma and Texas A&M, you might have gained a fresh appreciation for why this suggested sea change in coaching strategy has some merit. If you didn't watch this game or read about it in your Sunday paper, here's the recap: with roughly 90 seconds left in the game and Oklahoma clinging to a 17-16 lead over the Aggies, the Sooner offense faced a 4th and inches just short of its own 30. Dennis Franchione had just used his team's final timeout--and properly so--before the 4th down, to ensure that his offense would have 30-35 more seconds to work with... if it got the ball back. Stoops decided, however, to go for the first down, and sure enough, the Sooners pounded out a two-yard gain to wrap up their victory.
This is a classically difficult coaching decision, and while some disagreements are sure to make their way to the inbox on this issue (especially from people soured on Stoops after all the offseason incidents at Oklahoma), the verdict here is that Stoops made the right call. The reason is not the predictable one--namely, that the play worked. No, the choice was an appropriate one because of all the outside factors that formed the context in which the move was made.
Why did Bob Stoops make the right choice in this particular situation? There are a few reasons one needs to account for in arriving at a proper assessment of his decision. One of the reasons why this was a good move is that Texas A&M doesn't have the defense that R.C. Slocum made famous. If Dat Nguyen or other similar terrors were still part of the Aggie linebacking corps, one would definitely have to think twice about gaining a few inches. You want to be bold, but you don't want to be pigheaded in this kind of a situation, and OU's decision did not seem to fit in that category. A second reason why this strategy worked is something we talked about earlier in the year: if you can seal a game outright on one play, the rewards of that play are greater than the risks involved, which makes a bold approach surprisingly more percentage-based than one might initially think. Given that A&M necessarily had to use its last timeout before the fourth down, OU had the ability to end the game right then and there, instead of having to sweat out a defensive stand and hope that A&M couldn't get in field goal range. That's a worthwhile gamble. The third reason why the OU coach made a Stoop-endous decision was that his team had just inches to go. Given the weight and magnitude of this play, it's worth ascertaining when a smart and bold approach becomes a low-percentage gamble. Reasonable people can have different opinions on this issue, but this writer's opinion is that if the distance was anything over one full yard, a punt would have been more appropriate. But since this was a matter of inches--and the way the chains just happened to line up--Stoops was correct to not allow the placement of the sticks to dictate his thinking. Coaches have an annoying tendency to do that, and Stoops has a big-enough brain to look beyond the links in the chains.
All these reasons--as sound as they are--pale in comparison, however, to the number one justification for Stoops' decision in College Station: he knew what was best for his team. This is the biggest single reason why Pete Carroll at USC, Charlie Weis at Notre Dame, and Steve Spurrier--especially when at Florida--have, like Stoops, won so many ballgames with ballsy fourth-down decision making. The great coaches know what they can and can't afford to do, and more specifically, they know where games have to be won or lost. Carroll's 2005 USC team had to sink or swim with its powerful offense, not its shaky defense. Ergo, Carroll took a lot of fourth-down chances; they seemed to be low-percentage in an immediate statistical sense, but when you consider how good SC's offense was, those "gambles" were actually smart decisions when placed in a larger context. Weis--with a similar balance of good offense and bad defense, did the same thing with his Irish last season. Spurrier--especially when Danny Wuerffel reigned under center in the mid-90s--had the consummately unflappable trigger man with whom he could take unconventional risks. The 4th and 11 Spurrier and Wuerffel converted in the first quarter of a rain-soaked game at Tennessee in 1996 is one of the two plays that propelled the Gators to their only national championship. What about the second play? Well, that was an unusual fourth-down gamble as well: the 4th and inches play on which the Texas Longhorns and John Mackovic, backed up to their own 28 and up three (30-27) over Nebraska late in the fourth quarter, chose to go for the first down. James Brown faked run action and flipped a pass to Derek Lewis, whose huge gainer set up a game-sealing touchdown for Texas. The Longhorn win knocked Nebraska out of the Sugar Bowl, enabling Florida to play--and beat--Florida State for the whole ball of wax.
From these examples, one should get the idea that great fourth down play calls--which influence the trajectories of whole seasons in this sport--are made by coaches who know how to play to their team's strengths or, in some sense, appeal to the best instincts and desires of their kids. For Stoops, the reason why this call was best for his team is as follows: Oklahoma was not playing for a division or conference title. The truly lofty seasonal goals the Sooners normally have were unattainable going into this game. Add in the absence of Adrian Peterson, and everything about this game's importance for OU was connected to 2007 more than 2006. The task in front of Stoops is not to win 10 games this season, because 10 wins won't get OU to a BCS bowl or a conference crown. With a quarterback, a running back, and an offensive line that are all growing in confidence--but need to make game-defining plays in tough situations if they want to lift the Sooner program back to the top of the sport--Stoops wisely concluded that he needed to put his offense through the crucible of a late-game fourth down on the road. It wasn't so much about beating A&M as it was a matter of feeding a heaping helping of confidence to the same players who will be back in 2007. As the ESPN broadcast crew noted during Saturday night's game in College Station, Oklahoma has one of the smallest totals of seniors among any Division I-A team. Given this reality, it was important for Stoops to give his young offense a proving-ground moment. The 2007 season just got a lot better for the Sooners as a result of their coach's fourth-down move... and the offense's ability to reward it
Stoops did what Berkeley economist and freelance football researcher David Romer has advocated in the realm of football strategy. We reported back in August that Romer--as stated in a Joe Nocera column from the June 24 edition of the New York Times--concluded from a series of personally conducted studies that football coaches are too conservative when it comes to fourth-down decision making. More boldness and fewer punts were Romer's twin recommendations. Well, if you saw Saturday night's game between Oklahoma and Texas A&M, you might have gained a fresh appreciation for why this suggested sea change in coaching strategy has some merit. If you didn't watch this game or read about it in your Sunday paper, here's the recap: with roughly 90 seconds left in the game and Oklahoma clinging to a 17-16 lead over the Aggies, the Sooner offense faced a 4th and inches just short of its own 30. Dennis Franchione had just used his team's final timeout--and properly so--before the 4th down, to ensure that his offense would have 30-35 more seconds to work with... if it got the ball back. Stoops decided, however, to go for the first down, and sure enough, the Sooners pounded out a two-yard gain to wrap up their victory.
This is a classically difficult coaching decision, and while some disagreements are sure to make their way to the inbox on this issue (especially from people soured on Stoops after all the offseason incidents at Oklahoma), the verdict here is that Stoops made the right call. The reason is not the predictable one--namely, that the play worked. No, the choice was an appropriate one because of all the outside factors that formed the context in which the move was made.
Why did Bob Stoops make the right choice in this particular situation? There are a few reasons one needs to account for in arriving at a proper assessment of his decision. One of the reasons why this was a good move is that Texas A&M doesn't have the defense that R.C. Slocum made famous. If Dat Nguyen or other similar terrors were still part of the Aggie linebacking corps, one would definitely have to think twice about gaining a few inches. You want to be bold, but you don't want to be pigheaded in this kind of a situation, and OU's decision did not seem to fit in that category. A second reason why this strategy worked is something we talked about earlier in the year: if you can seal a game outright on one play, the rewards of that play are greater than the risks involved, which makes a bold approach surprisingly more percentage-based than one might initially think. Given that A&M necessarily had to use its last timeout before the fourth down, OU had the ability to end the game right then and there, instead of having to sweat out a defensive stand and hope that A&M couldn't get in field goal range. That's a worthwhile gamble. The third reason why the OU coach made a Stoop-endous decision was that his team had just inches to go. Given the weight and magnitude of this play, it's worth ascertaining when a smart and bold approach becomes a low-percentage gamble. Reasonable people can have different opinions on this issue, but this writer's opinion is that if the distance was anything over one full yard, a punt would have been more appropriate. But since this was a matter of inches--and the way the chains just happened to line up--Stoops was correct to not allow the placement of the sticks to dictate his thinking. Coaches have an annoying tendency to do that, and Stoops has a big-enough brain to look beyond the links in the chains.
All these reasons--as sound as they are--pale in comparison, however, to the number one justification for Stoops' decision in College Station: he knew what was best for his team. This is the biggest single reason why Pete Carroll at USC, Charlie Weis at Notre Dame, and Steve Spurrier--especially when at Florida--have, like Stoops, won so many ballgames with ballsy fourth-down decision making. The great coaches know what they can and can't afford to do, and more specifically, they know where games have to be won or lost. Carroll's 2005 USC team had to sink or swim with its powerful offense, not its shaky defense. Ergo, Carroll took a lot of fourth-down chances; they seemed to be low-percentage in an immediate statistical sense, but when you consider how good SC's offense was, those "gambles" were actually smart decisions when placed in a larger context. Weis--with a similar balance of good offense and bad defense, did the same thing with his Irish last season. Spurrier--especially when Danny Wuerffel reigned under center in the mid-90s--had the consummately unflappable trigger man with whom he could take unconventional risks. The 4th and 11 Spurrier and Wuerffel converted in the first quarter of a rain-soaked game at Tennessee in 1996 is one of the two plays that propelled the Gators to their only national championship. What about the second play? Well, that was an unusual fourth-down gamble as well: the 4th and inches play on which the Texas Longhorns and John Mackovic, backed up to their own 28 and up three (30-27) over Nebraska late in the fourth quarter, chose to go for the first down. James Brown faked run action and flipped a pass to Derek Lewis, whose huge gainer set up a game-sealing touchdown for Texas. The Longhorn win knocked Nebraska out of the Sugar Bowl, enabling Florida to play--and beat--Florida State for the whole ball of wax.
From these examples, one should get the idea that great fourth down play calls--which influence the trajectories of whole seasons in this sport--are made by coaches who know how to play to their team's strengths or, in some sense, appeal to the best instincts and desires of their kids. For Stoops, the reason why this call was best for his team is as follows: Oklahoma was not playing for a division or conference title. The truly lofty seasonal goals the Sooners normally have were unattainable going into this game. Add in the absence of Adrian Peterson, and everything about this game's importance for OU was connected to 2007 more than 2006. The task in front of Stoops is not to win 10 games this season, because 10 wins won't get OU to a BCS bowl or a conference crown. With a quarterback, a running back, and an offensive line that are all growing in confidence--but need to make game-defining plays in tough situations if they want to lift the Sooner program back to the top of the sport--Stoops wisely concluded that he needed to put his offense through the crucible of a late-game fourth down on the road. It wasn't so much about beating A&M as it was a matter of feeding a heaping helping of confidence to the same players who will be back in 2007. As the ESPN broadcast crew noted during Saturday night's game in College Station, Oklahoma has one of the smallest totals of seniors among any Division I-A team. Given this reality, it was important for Stoops to give his young offense a proving-ground moment. The 2007 season just got a lot better for the Sooners as a result of their coach's fourth-down move... and the offense's ability to reward it