Jerk
10/5/2007, 11:56 PM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov
Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov (Russian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_language): Станислав Евграфович Петров) (born c. 1939 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939)) is a retired Russian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia) Strategic Rocket Forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Rocket_Forces) lieutenant colonel who, on September 26 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_26), 1983 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983), deviated from standard Soviet doctrine by positively identifying a missile attack warning as a false alarm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_alarm). This decision, according to several sources, was a major factor in preventing an accidental retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States). Investigation of the satellite warning system later confirmed that the system had been malfunctioning.
Though there continue to be varying reports as to whether Petrov actually reported the alert to his superiors, or what part his decision ultimately played in preventing nuclear war (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_war), his willingness to risk punishment in order to possibly prevent a catastrophe exposed a critical flaw in the Soviet missile warning system and deeply embarrassed the upper echelons of the Soviet Army. In retaliation, he was branded as an "unreliable" officer, ruining his military career. Because of Soviet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet) military secrecy and international political concerns, Petrov's actions were kept secret until 1998 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998).
This incident is one of several high-risk decisions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_III#Historical_close_calls) that were made by strategic nuclear forces over the years of the Cold War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War), often at the last minute, by administrative personnel far from the chain of command (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_of_command).
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/5/5f/Petrov1.jpg/180px-Petrov1.jpg
Stanislav Petrov was a Strategic Rocket Forces lieutenant colonel, the officer on duty at the Serpukhov-15 bunker near Moscow (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow) on September 26 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_26), 1983 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983). Petrov's responsibilities included observing the satellite early warning network and notifying his superiors of any impending nuclear missile attack against the Soviet Union. In the event of such an attack, the Soviet Union's strategy was an immediate nuclear counter-attack against the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States), specified in the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction).
At 00:40 hrs, the bunker's computers identified a US missile (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercontinental_ballistic_missile) heading toward the Soviet Union.[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-red) Petrov considered the detection a computer error, since a United States first-strike nuclear attack would hypothetically involve hundreds if not thousands of simultaneous missile launches to disable any Soviet means for a counterattack. Furthermore, the satellite system's reliability had been questioned in the past.[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-wash) Petrov dismissed the warning as a false alarm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_alarm), though accounts of the event differ as to whether he notified his superiors[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-AWC) or not[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-red) after he concluded that the computer detections were false and that the United States had not launched any missile. Later, the computers identified four additional missiles in the air, all directed towards the Soviet Union. Petrov once again decided that the computer system was malfunctioning, despite there being no other source of information to confirm his suspicions. The Soviet Union's land radar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar) was not capable of detecting missiles beyond the horizon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horizon) and waiting for them to positively identify the threat would limit the Soviet Union's response time to mere minutes.
Should Petrov have disregarded a real attack, the Soviet Union would have been struck by several nuclear missiles. Had he reported the incoming American missiles, his superiors might have launched a catastrophic assault against their enemies, precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States. Petrov trusted his intuition and declared the system's indications a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that his instincts were right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false alarms had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites' Molniya orbits (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molniya_orbit) (an error later corrected with cross-reference to a geostationary satellite).[5] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-0)
Petrov later indicated the influences in this enormous decision included the facts that he had been told a US-strike would be all-out, that five missiles seemed an illogical start, that the launch detection system was new and not yet in his view wholly trustworthy, and that ground radars were still failing to pick up any corroborative evidence even after minutes of delay. [6] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-1)
:cool:
Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov (Russian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_language): Станислав Евграфович Петров) (born c. 1939 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939)) is a retired Russian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia) Strategic Rocket Forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Rocket_Forces) lieutenant colonel who, on September 26 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_26), 1983 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983), deviated from standard Soviet doctrine by positively identifying a missile attack warning as a false alarm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_alarm). This decision, according to several sources, was a major factor in preventing an accidental retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States). Investigation of the satellite warning system later confirmed that the system had been malfunctioning.
Though there continue to be varying reports as to whether Petrov actually reported the alert to his superiors, or what part his decision ultimately played in preventing nuclear war (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_war), his willingness to risk punishment in order to possibly prevent a catastrophe exposed a critical flaw in the Soviet missile warning system and deeply embarrassed the upper echelons of the Soviet Army. In retaliation, he was branded as an "unreliable" officer, ruining his military career. Because of Soviet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet) military secrecy and international political concerns, Petrov's actions were kept secret until 1998 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998).
This incident is one of several high-risk decisions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_III#Historical_close_calls) that were made by strategic nuclear forces over the years of the Cold War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War), often at the last minute, by administrative personnel far from the chain of command (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_of_command).
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/5/5f/Petrov1.jpg/180px-Petrov1.jpg
Stanislav Petrov was a Strategic Rocket Forces lieutenant colonel, the officer on duty at the Serpukhov-15 bunker near Moscow (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow) on September 26 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_26), 1983 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983). Petrov's responsibilities included observing the satellite early warning network and notifying his superiors of any impending nuclear missile attack against the Soviet Union. In the event of such an attack, the Soviet Union's strategy was an immediate nuclear counter-attack against the United States (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States), specified in the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction).
At 00:40 hrs, the bunker's computers identified a US missile (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercontinental_ballistic_missile) heading toward the Soviet Union.[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-red) Petrov considered the detection a computer error, since a United States first-strike nuclear attack would hypothetically involve hundreds if not thousands of simultaneous missile launches to disable any Soviet means for a counterattack. Furthermore, the satellite system's reliability had been questioned in the past.[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-wash) Petrov dismissed the warning as a false alarm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_alarm), though accounts of the event differ as to whether he notified his superiors[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-AWC) or not[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-red) after he concluded that the computer detections were false and that the United States had not launched any missile. Later, the computers identified four additional missiles in the air, all directed towards the Soviet Union. Petrov once again decided that the computer system was malfunctioning, despite there being no other source of information to confirm his suspicions. The Soviet Union's land radar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar) was not capable of detecting missiles beyond the horizon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horizon) and waiting for them to positively identify the threat would limit the Soviet Union's response time to mere minutes.
Should Petrov have disregarded a real attack, the Soviet Union would have been struck by several nuclear missiles. Had he reported the incoming American missiles, his superiors might have launched a catastrophic assault against their enemies, precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States. Petrov trusted his intuition and declared the system's indications a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that his instincts were right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false alarms had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites' Molniya orbits (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molniya_orbit) (an error later corrected with cross-reference to a geostationary satellite).[5] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-0)
Petrov later indicated the influences in this enormous decision included the facts that he had been told a US-strike would be all-out, that five missiles seemed an illogical start, that the launch detection system was new and not yet in his view wholly trustworthy, and that ground radars were still failing to pick up any corroborative evidence even after minutes of delay. [6] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov#_note-1)
:cool: